A new definition of continuous-time equilibrium controls is introduced. As opposed to the standard definition, which involves a derivative-type operation, the new definition parallels how a discrete-time equilibrium is defined, and allows for unambiguous economic interpretation. The terms "strong equilibria" and "weak equilibria" are coined for controls under the new and the standard definitions, respectively. When the state process is a time-homogeneous continuoustime Markov chain, a careful asymptotic analysis gives complete characterizations of weak and strong equilibria. Thanks to Kakutani-Fan's fixed-point theorem, general existence of weak and strong equilibria is also established, under additional compactness assumption. Our theoretic results are applied to a two-state model under non-exponential discounting. In particular, we demonstrate explicitly that there can be incentive to deviate from a weak equilibrium, which justifies the need for strong equilibria. Our analysis also provides new results for the existence and characterization of discrete-time equilibria under infinite horizon.
Introduction
Under time-inconsistency, an optimal rule derived today may not be optimal from the eyes of a future self. There is no "dynamically optimal strategy" that is good for the whole planning horizon, as opposed to standard time-consistent models. A sensible reaction to time-inconsistency, introduced in Strotz [14] , is to take future selves' behavior as a constraint, and find the best current action in response to that. When every future self also reasons in this way, the resulting strategy is a (subgame perfect) equilibrium, from which no future self has incentive to deviate.
This equilibrium approach, while widely-accepted, is highly nontrivial for stochastic control in continuous time. The upfront challenge is how to precisely define a continuous-time equilibrium.
In discrete time, this is not a challenge at all: Let F (x, α) be an objective function, depending on current state x and the selected control α. An equilibrium α * can be defined as F (x, α * ) ≥ F (x, α ⊗ 1 α * ), ∀x and α, (1.1)
where α ⊗ 1 α * means that we apply α only at time 0, and switch to α * from time 1 on. The economic interpretation is clear: given that all future selves will follow α * , using any other control α at current time is no better than sticking to α * , i.e. no incentive for the current self to deviate from α * , conforming to the equilibrium idea. A continuous-time analogy to (1.1) is far from obvious. Since the current self only exists at "time point 0", which carries no mass in continuous time, his decision to use a different strategy α normally has no effect on F . In other words, while one could replace the right hand side of (1.1) by lim ε↓0 F (x, α ⊗ ε α * ), in most cases this limit equals F (x, α * ), leaving the comparison like (1.1) meaningless. Ekeland and Lazrak [5] provided, for the first time, a precise definition of a continuous-time equilibrium: roughly speaking, α * is an equilibrium if lim inf ε↓0 F (x, α * ) − F (x, α ⊗ ε α * ) ε ≥ 0, ∀x and α.
(
1.2)
This formulation has spurred vibrant research on time-inconsistent control problems in continuous time, arising mainly in mathematical finance; see [7] , [6] , [10] , [15] , [2] , and [1] , among many others. While (1.2) has to some extent become the standard formulation of continuous-time equilibria, it cannot be fully justified in the economic sense.
As pointed out in Björk, Khapko, and Murgoci [1, Remark 3.5], (1.2) does not correspond perfectly to the equilibrium concept: when (1.2) holds with equality, α * can be a stationary point that is not a maximum point. That is, it is possible that for some x and α, F (x, α * ) < F (x, α⊗ ε α * ) for all ε > 0, but the limit in (1.2) is still zero. Then, when the current self is at the state x, there is incentive to deviate: following α, in a however small interval [0, ε], is better than sticking to α * . In view of this, α * should not be considered as an equilibrium, yet it is included under (1.2). In short, (1.2) may be too weak a definition to precisely reflect the equilibrium idea.
In this paper, a new definition of continuous-time equilibria is introduced: α * is an equilibrium if for any x and α, there exists ε * = ε * (x, α) > 0 such that F (x, α * ) ≥ F (x, α ⊗ ε α * ) for all 0 < ε < ε * .
1.3)
This is analogous to (1.1), and admits the following economic interpretation: if (1.3) is violated for some (x, α), then for the current self at the state x, deviating to α, in a however small interval [0, ε] , is better than sticking to α * . Such incentive to deviate disappears when α * is an equilibrium; see Remark 2.1 for details. Note that (1.3) entails (1.2), but not vice versa. Throughout this paper, we will call equilibria under (1.3) "strong equilibria" (Definition 2.2), and those under (1.2) "weak equilibria" (Definition 2.1). The main goal of this paper is to elucidate the difference, as well as the connection, between strong and weak equilibria. Specifically, we take the controlled state process X to be a time-homogeneous continuous-time Markov chain. By selecting an appropriate generator Q for X, an agent intends to maximize his expected cumulative running payoff over infinite horizon. The running payoff function is allowed to be time-dependent, making the problem time-inconsistent in general. This framework particularly covers optimization under non-exponential discounting.
By detailed asymptotic analysis of the right hand side of (1.3), now taking the form F (x, Q ⊗ ε Q * ), we establish complete characterizations of both weak and strong equilibria; see Theorems 3.1 and 3.2. We see that an equilibrium being weak amounts to dominance in the first-order term, while being strong demands a more delicate structure involving higher-order terms. This in turn leads to a handy machinery for finding weak and strong equilibria; see Propositions 3.1, 3.2, and Theorem 3.2. In a two-state model under pseudo-exponential discounting, such a machinery is demonstrated in detail through concrete examples. In particular, we construct explicitly a weak equilibrium Q * such that for some specific (x, Q), F (x, Q * ) < F (x, Q ⊗ ε Q * ) for all ε > 0 small enough. That is, although Q * satisfies (1.2), there is incentive to deviate from Q * in a however small interval [0, ε], when the current state is x; see Example 4.3 and Remark 4.1. This justifies the need for the new notion of strong equilibria.
Note that the machinery for finding equilibria, while useful, is meant to be applied on a caseby-case basis, and does not say a priori whether an equilibrim exists. Thanks to Kakutani-Fan's fixed-point theorem, a general existence result for weak and strong equilibria can be established, under additional compactness assumption on the admissible set of Q; see Theorem 3.3.
The literature of time-inconsistent stochastic control in continuous-time, as mentioned above, focuses solely on weak equilbira, which are usually characterized as (i) solutions to a system of nonlinear differential equations, the so-called extended HJB system (see e.g. [7] and [1] ), or (ii) the limit points of a sequence of discrete-time equilibria, when the discrete time mesh tends to zero (see e.g. [15] and [1] ). Our analysis complements both (i) and (ii) above.
First, note that (i) above is a partial characterization: if one finds smooth solutions to the nonlinear system, an equilibrium can be constructed from them. Yet, solving the system is generally difficult, and it is also not clear whether every equilibrium is related to such a system. By contrast, in our case where X is a continuous-time controlled Markov chain, more tractable than a controlled diffusion mostly used in the literature, we obtain complete (i.e. "if and only if") characterization for weak equilibrium (Theorem 3.1), and an easy-to-check criterion for finding them (Proposition 3.1).
On the other hand, we obtain in Theorem 5.2 that discrete-time equilibria converge to weak equilibria in continuous time, under appropriate continuity assumption. Interestingly, it is guaranteed to converge only to weak, but not strong, equilibria. As shown in Example 5.1, a sequence of discrete-time equilibria converge uniquely to a weak equilibrium that is not strong.
Finally, our continuous-time analysis also sheds new light on discrete-time problems. In discrete time, an equilibrium is defined unambiguously as (1.1), and it can be found by straightforward backward sequential optimization in Pollak [13] , when time horizon is finite. Under infinite horizon, such backward procedure breaks down; it is unclear whether an equilibrium exists in general, and a systematic way for finding equilibria is lacking. The continuous-time arguments in Theorem 3.1 and Proposition 3.1 turn out to be helpful: they can be modified to discrete time, giving a very general existence result for equilibria, as well as a handy criterion for finding equilibria, for the kind of time-inconsistent problems we focus on; see Theorem 5.1 and Proposition 5.1.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the setup of our time-inconsistent problem, and defines the two distinct notions of weak and strong equilibria. Section 3 collects the main results, including complete characterization and general existence for both weak and strong equilibria. Section 4 applies the theoretic results to a concrete two-state model, where we demonstrate explicitly that there can be incentive to deviate from a weak equilibrium. Section 5 derives several new results for the corresponding discrete-time problem, and proves the convergence of discrete-time equilibria to a weak equilibrium. Section 6 concludes the paper.
The Setup and Definitions
Let X = (X t ) t≥0 be a time-homogeneous continuous-time Markov chain taking values in S := {1, 2, . . . , N }, for some N ∈ N. The generator Q ∈ R N ×N of X is to be controlled. For each i ∈ S, let
be the admissible set of Q i , the i-th row of the generator Q. Consider
Consider a payoff function f such that for any t ≥ 0, i ∈ S, and q ∈ D i , the value f (t, i, q) ∈ R stands for the payment rate at time t, given that X t = i and Q i = q. We assume that
In addition, we impose the integrability condition
where · denotes the Euclidean norm in R N . Note that (2.2) particularly implies that t → sup i∈S,q∈D i |f (t, i, q)| is lower semicontinuous, and thus Lebesgue measurable, which makes sense of the integration in (2.3). For any i ∈ S and Q ∈ Q, (2.3) guarantees that the expected payoff
is well-defined, where E i,Q denotes the expectation conditioned on X 0 = i and the generator of X being Q. Throughout this paper, we will write E i for E i,Q whenever there is no confusion about Q.
In general, an agent who aims to maximize F (i, Q) by selecting Q ∈ Q may run into the issue of time-inconsistency. Specifically, an optimal control Q * ∈ Q for the problem
may depend on the initial state i, so we write it as Q * (i). At a later date t > 0 with X t = j = i, Q * (i) may no longer be optimal for the problem (2.5), now with i replaced by j, so that the agent is tempted to deviate to Q * (j), optimal in his view at time t. A typical example is optimization under non-exponential discounting. In this case, f takes the form
] is a discount function, assumed to be strictly decreasing with δ(0) = 1, and g is a general measurable function. It is well-known that the problem (2.5) is time-consistent for the specific case δ(t) := e −ρt for some ρ > 0, but time-inconsistent in general.
As described in Strotz [14] , when an agent is sophisticated enough to realize that his "future selves" will override his current plan (due to the lack of commitment), a sensible reaction is to take his future selves' behavior as a constraint, and choose the best present action in response to that. Assuming that all future selves reason in the same way, the agent searches for a (subgame perfect) equilibrium strategy, from which no future self has incentive to deviate.
While such equilibrium strategies have a straightforward definition in discrete time (see e.g. Definition 5.1 below), finding a precise continuous-time formulation had been a long-standing challenge. Ekeland and Lazrak [5] provided, for the first time, a rigorous definition of a continuous-time equilibrium, using a derivative-type operation. This has spurred vibrant research on time-inconsistent stochastic control in continuous time, as mentioned in the introduction.
To formulate an equilibrium in the sense of [5] , we introduce, for any Q, Q ′ ∈ Q and ε > 0, the concatenation of Q and Q ′ at time ε, denoted by Q ⊗ ε Q ′ . Using this concatenated generator means that the evolution of X is governed first by Q on the interval [0, ε], and then by Q ′ on (ε, ∞).
Definition 2.1 follows the standard formulation of a continuous-time equilibrium, which always involves a first-order inequality as in (2.7). This was introduced in [5] , and followed by all subsequent research. Despite its popularity, this formulation cannot be fully justified economically.
Intuitively, what we desire to have from (2.7) is that F (i, Q * ) ≥ F (i, Q ⊗ ε Q * ) as ε > 0 small enough, for all (i, Q). Yet, this is not ensured by (2.7). As pointed out in Björk, Khapko, and Murgoci [1, Remark 3.5], the standard formulation, such as (2.7), does not correspond perfectly to the equilibrium concept: when (2.7) holds with equality, it is unclear whether Q * is a maximum point or a stationary point. In other words, it can be that for some Q ∈ Q and i ∈ S, F (i, Q * ) < F (i, Q ⊗ ε Q * ) for all ε > 0, but the limit in (2.7) is still zero. Then, the agent at the state i does have incentive to deviate: following Q, in a however small interval [0, ε], is better than sticking to Q * . As such, Q * should not be considered as an equilibrium, yet it is included under (2.7).
This explains the terminology "weak equilibrium" in Definition 2.1. As opposed to that, we introduce the new notion of a strong equilibrium. Definition 2.2. Q * ∈ Q is called a strong equilibrium if, for any i ∈ S and Q ∈ Q there exists ε > 0 such that
Remark 2.1. Definition 2.2 admits the following economic interpretation. If (2.8) is violated for some (i, Q), then there exist {ε n } n∈N such that ε n ↓ 0 and
Thus, for the agent at the state i, deviating to α, in a however small interval [0, ε n ], n ∈ N, is better than sticking to α * . Such incentive to deviate disappears when Q * is a strong equilibrium.
It is of interest to investigate the relation between the standard notion of weak equilibria and our new concept of strong equilibria. Some immediate observations can be made. Remark 2.2. By definition, a strong equilibrium is also a weak one. On the other hand, if a weak equilibrium satisfies (2.7) with strict inequality for all Q ∈ Q and i ∈ S, then (2.8) must hold for any i ∈ Sand Q ∈ Q, showing that the weak equilibrium is in fact strong. The unclear, challenging case is when Q * a weak equilibrium and (2.7) holds with equality for some Q ∈ Q and i ∈ S.
The goal of this paper is to elucidate the difference, as well as the connection, between the two notions of strong and weak equilibria. This will be done at two different levels. Theoretically, complete characterizations for both weak and strong equilibria will be derived. Based on this, we will demonstrate how a weak equilibrium can differ from a strong one in concrete examples. In particular, we will show explicitly that there can be incentive to deviate from a weak equilibrium, as described in Remark 2.1, which justifies the new notion of strong equilibria.
The Main Results

Characterizations of Weak and Strong Equilibria
In this section, we will carry out detailed asymptotic analysis of F (i, Q * ) − F (i, Q ⊗ ε Q * ) as ε ↓ 0. This will lead us to the distinct, yet connected, characterizations of weak and strong equilibria in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2.
Recall F (i, Q) in (2.4). For any i ∈ S, Q ∈ Q, and ε > 0, we define
Then, we will write F (Q) := (F (1, Q) , . . . , F (N, Q)) and F ε (Q) := (F ε (1, Q) , . . . , F ε (N, Q)).
Also recall that Q i denotes the i th row of Q.
Lemma 3.1. Assume (2.2) and (2.3). Fix i ∈ S and Q, Q * ∈ Q. Then, as ε ↓ 0,
Suppose further that (2.2) is strengthened to the following:
where h is a nonnegative function such that
Then, as ε ↓ 0,
The proof of Lemma 3.1 is relegated to Appendix A.1.
Remark 3.1. Under non-exponential discounting as in (2.6), assumptions in Lemma 3.1 turn into mild conditions on the discount function δ: (2.2) amounts to the continuity of δ; (2.3) reduces to
2) is equivalent to the continuity of δ and
Note that (3.7) implies (3.8), but not vice versa. Indeed, if (3.7) holds, the integral in (3.8) reduces to ε 0 δ(t)dt, which is finite for all ε > 0. On the other hand, it can be checked that the hyperbolic discount function δ(t) := 1 1+βt , with β > 0, satisfies (3.8), but not (3.7). Hence, " (2.3) and (3.2)" reduces to "δ is continuous and satisfies (3.7)". This already covers many commonly-seen non-exponential discount functions, such as generalized hyperbolic δ(t) := 1 (1+βt) k with β > 0 and k > 1, and pseudo-exponential δ(t) := λe −ρ 1 t + (1 − λ)e −ρ 2 t with λ ∈ (0, 1) and ρ 1 , ρ 2 > 0. Suppose X 0 = i and that all future selves beyond time ε > 0 will follow Q * ∈ Q. In view of (3.5), when the current self deviates from Q * along Q ∈ Q on a small time interval [0, ε], the (approximate) rate of change of the expected payoff
Intuitively, the current self would like to follow Q * ∈ Q on [0, ε], only when this rate of change is maximized by Q = Q * , i.e. when
This is equivalent to, for all Q ∈ Q,
The relation (3.9) provides a complete characterization of weak equilibria.
Theorem 3.1. Assume (2.3) and (3.2). Then, Q * ∈ Q is a weak equilibrium if and only if (3.9) holds for all (i, Q) ∈ S × Q.
Proof. For any i ∈ S and Q ∈ Q, by Lemma 3.1 (specifically (3.5)), as ε ↓ 0,
This shows that (2.7) is satisfied (i.e. Q * is a weak equilibrium) if and only if (3.9) holds for all (i, Q) ∈ S × Q.
Theorem 3.1 has two important consequences. First, it gives rise to a handy criterion for weak equilibria. Specifially, for any i ∈ S and differentiable function v : D i → R, let ∇v(α) be the gradient of v evaluated at α ∈ D i , and ∂ n v(α) be the n-th component of ∇v(α). Let
If Q * ∈ Q is a weak equilibrium, then for any i ∈ S,
Furthermore, if f (0, i, ·) is additionally concave for all i ∈ S, the converse of (3.12) is also true; that is, Q * is a weak equilibrium if and only if (3.12) holds.
Proof. Let Q * be a weak equilibrium. Fix i ∈ S. For any ε > 0 and λ ∈ T such that
Then (3.12) follows by sending ε ↓ 0. Conversely, suppose Q * ∈ Q satisfies (3.12). If f (0, i, ·) is concave for all i ∈ S, then the map
is concave for all i ∈ S. This, together with (3.12), shows that ξ = Q * i is a global maximum of (3.13), for all i ∈ S. By Theorem 3.1, this implies that Q * is a weak equilibrium.
We will demonstrate the usefulness of Proposition 3.1 through concrete examples in Section 4. The second consequence of Theorem 3.1 is that its proof immediately gives a sufficient condition for strong equilibria.
Corollary 3.1. Assume (2.3) and (3.2). If Q * ∈ Q satisfies (3.9) with strict inequality for all i ∈ S and Q ∈ Q \ {Q * }, then it is a strong equilibrium.
Proof. Fix i ∈ S and Q ∈ Q \ {Q * }. If (3.9) holds with strict inequality, we observe from (3.10) that F (i, Q * ) − F (i, Q ⊗ ε Q * ) > 0 as long as ε > 0 is small enough.
In general, a weak equilibrium Q * ∈ Q may satisfy (3.9) with equality for some i ∈ S and Q ∈ Q \ {Q * }. In this case, the first-order term in (3.5) (and thus in (3.10)) is zero, leaving the argument in Corollary 3.1 inconclusive. To further examine if Q * ∈ Q is a strong equilibrium, one needs to upgrade (3.5) to an expansion of second order or higher.
To this end, whenever f (·, i, q) ∈ C 1 , we define, for any (i, Q) ∈ S × Q, the function
In addition, we will write
for all i ∈ S and q ∈ D i . Assume additionally that f t also satisfies (2.3), and that
where r is a function continuous in ε, and satisfies (3.4) with
Then, for any i ∈ S and Q, Q * ∈ Q, as ε ↓ 0,
where Γ Q * (i, Q) is defined as in (3.6) and
The proof of Lemma 3.2 is relegated to Appendix A.2.
Remark 3.2. By Taylor's theorem, f (·, i, q) ∈ C 1 readily implies
Hence, there obviously exist a sequence {ε k } k∈N with ε k ↓ 0, depending on (t, i, q), such that r(t, ε k ; i, q)/ε k decreases to 0. In view of this, (3.15) is slightly stronger than "f (·, i, q) ∈ C 1 for all (i, q)": it requires r(t, ε k ; i, q)/ε k to decrease for any arbitrary {ε k } k∈N with ε k ↓ 0.
Remark 3.3. Under non-exponential discounting as in (2.6), all conditions imposed in Lemma 3.2 boil down to mild conditions on the discount function δ:
• By Remark 3.1, "f satisfies (2.3)" reduces to (3.7).
• "f (·, i, q) ∈ C 1 with f t satisfying (2.3)" amounts to
• "r(t, ε; i, q) satisfies (3.4)" reduces to
Note that this is always true under (3.7) and (3.19); recall from Remark 3.1 that (3.7) implies (3.8).
• " r(t,ε;i,q) ε increasing in ε, for all (t, i, q)" boils down to
A useful sufficient condition for (3.20) is δ being convex.
Hence, conditions imposed in Lemma 3.2 reduce to (3.7), (3.19), and (3.20). This already covers many commonly-seen non-exponential discount functions, including generalized hyperbolic and pseudo-exponential as mentioned in Remark 3.1.
Lemma 3.2 gives rise to a useful criterion for strong equilibria.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose f satisfies the conditions specified in Lemma 3.2. Let Q * ∈ Q be a weak equilibrium such that
Proof. Given (i, Q) ∈ (R 1 ) c , Theorem 3.1 implies that (3.9) must hold with strict inequality. Then, the argument in Corollary 3.1 readily shows that
. By Lemma 3.2, this implies
showing that Q * is not a strong equilibrium.
Proposition 3.2 is an upgraded version of Corollary 3.1, on the strength of the second-order expansion of F (i, Q * ) − F (i, Q ⊗ ε Q * ) in Lemma 3.2. Still, there is the inconclusive case where
To resolve this, one needs to upgrade Proposition 3.2 further, with a higher-order expansion. Repeating this line of reasoning leads to the following characterization of strong equilibria. Theorem 3.2. Suppose there exist functions L n : S × Q × Q → R, n ∈ N, such that as ε ↓ 0,
Then, Q * ∈ Q is a strong equilibrium if and only if for any (i, Q) ∈ S × Q, one of the following holds:
Proof. Suppose Q * ∈ Q is a strong equilibrium. Assume to the contrary that there exists (i, Q) ∈ S × Q for which neither (i) nor (ii) holds. Then, there must existn ∈ N such that L n (i, Q, Q * ) = 0 for all n <n and Ln(i, Q, Q * ) < 0. Consequently, (3.24) yields
With Ln(i, Q, Q * ) strictly negative, F (i, Q * ) < F (i, Q ⊗ ε Q * ) for ε > 0 small enough. This contradicts Q * being a strong equilibrium. On the other hand, suppose either (i) or (ii) holds for
This shows that Q * is a strong equilibrium.
Proposition 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 together provide a machinery for finding strong equilibria. First, one uses Proposition 3.1 to find weak equilibria. Theorem 3.2 comes into play next, when one wants to determine if a weak equilibrium Q * ∈ Q is in fact strong. In principle, one can derive higher-order expansions for F (i, Q * ) − F (i, Q ⊗ ε Q * ) to check whether (i) or (ii) in Theorem 3.2 holds. Such derivations, in practice, can be quite technical and complicated, as shown in the proof of Lemma 3.2 (even for the second-order expansion).
Since the main focus of this paper is to introduce and motivate the new notion of strong equilibria, we will not pursue expanding F (i, Q * ) − F (i, Q ⊗ ε Q * ) any further. As we will see in Section 4, the second-order expansion in Lemma 3.2 already allows explicit demonstrations of how strong and weak equilibria can differ, and why the strong notion is needed.
General Existence of Equilibria under Compactness
When a particular payoff function f is given, one can use Proposition 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 to search for weak and strong equilibria, as discussed below Theorem 3.2. While this machinery for finding equilibria is useful on a case-by-case basis, it does not say a priori whether an equilibrium exists.
It is therefore of interest to establish a general existence result for equilibria, without specifics of f . This can be done by additional compactness assumption on admissible sets. Theorem 3.3. Suppose that D i in (2.1) is a convex compact set for all i ∈ S, and f satisfies (2.3) with f (0, i, ·) being concave for all i ∈ S. Then, there exists a weak equilibrium. If f (0, i, ·) is strictly concave for all i ∈ S, then there exists a strong equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 3.3 is relegated to Appendix A.3.
Remark 3.4. Without compactness of D i , the existence of an equilibrium, weak or strong, does not hold in general, even when f (0, i, ·) is concave. For instance, consider S = {1, 2}, f (t, 1, ·) ≡ 0, f (t, 2, ·) ≡ e −t , and D i = E i for i = 1, 2, i.e. no constraint at all for the generator Q = (q ij ) i,j=1,2 . For any fixed Q * ∈ Q, by the definition of f , we have F (1, Q * ) < F (2, Q * ) and (3.9) reads
This ineqaulity is violated as long as q 12 > q * 12 . That is, (3.9) does not hold for all i ∈ S and Q ∈ Q, which precludes the existence of any weak (and thus strong) equilibrium, thanks to Theorem 3.1.
When each D i is convex and closed, but need not be bounded, we consider, for each C > 0, the bounded set D C i := {q ∈ D i : ||q|| ≤ C} and the corresponding set of generators
Applying Theorem 3.3 to Q C gives the following result.
Corollary 3.2. Suppose f satisfies (2.3) and f (0, i, ·) is concave (resp. strictly concave) for all i ∈ S. For any C > 0, there exists Q * C ∈ Q C such that (3.9) holds for all (i, Q) ∈ S × Q C . Furthermore, if there is C > 0 such that (Q * C ) i < C for all i ∈ S, then Q * C is a weak (resp. strong) equilibrium.
A Two-State Model
In this section, we focus on a tractable two-state model under non-exponential discounting. Our goal is to demonstrate explicitly how theoretic results in Section 3 can be used to find weak and strong equilibria, and how these two types of equilibria can differ from each other.
Take S = {1, 2} and
We will denote this by Q ∼ (a, b). Consider the pseudo-exponential discount function
where λ ∈ (0, 1) and ρ, ρ ′ ≥ 0 are given constants. Assume that
for some given measurable functions g 1 and g 2 . Given Q ∼ (a, b), we will write F (i, Q) and G(i, Q) as F i (a, b) and G i (a, b), respectively, for i = 1, 2. Observe that the transition probability of X, under Q ∼ (a, b), is given by
where
Hence, we can calculate that for i = 1, 2,
Therefore,
It follows that for any Q ∼ (a, b) and
The next example shows how Proposition 3.1 can be a convenient tool to find weak equilibria. Other results in Section 3 can then be applied to check if a weak equilibrium is actually strong.
is a weak equilibrium if and only if the following holds: (i) if a, b > 0, we have 9) and (ii) if a = 0 (resp. b = 0), then "≤" holds in (4.8) (resp. (4.9)). Thanks to (4.2), solving the above equations yields a unique solution (a * , b * ) = ( (b), respectively; recall (4.4) and (4.5). Now, by the strict concavity of g 1 and g 2 , a * and b * are in fact the unique maximizers. This shows that Q * ∼ ( ) is actually a strong equilibrium, thanks to Corollary 3.1.
An equilibrium can reside on the boundary of an admissible set, as the next example shows.
. By using Proposition 3.1 as in Example 4.1, we obtain a unique weak equilibrium Q * ∼ (a * , 0), where a * > 0 is the unique solution to
By the strict concavity of g 1 and g 2 , the same argument in Example 4.1 shows that Q * ∼ (a * , 0) is in fact a strong equilibrium.
In the above two examples, weak equilibria are also strong, thanks to the strict concavity of g 1 and g 2 . In general, a weak equilibrium may not be strong, and determining whether it is strong can be much more involved than applying Corollary 3.1. This is demonstrated in the next example, where two equilibria co-exist: one is a weak equilibrium that is not strong; the other is strong. Note that g 2 is concave and C 1 on [0, ∞), but strictly concave only on ( is not a unique maximizer in (4.10). We will instead resort to Proposition 3.2. With the aid of (4.2) and (4.3), we deduce from (4.7) that
This shows that Λ
For any Q ∼ (a * , b) with b ∈ [0, 7/12), (4.10) and (4.11) imply that (2, Q) ∈ R 1 (recall (3.21)) and Λ Q * (2, Q * ) < Λ Q * (2, Q). By Proposition 3.2, Q * ∼ (a * , b * ) is not a strong equilibrium. Now, when using Proposition 3.1 to find weak equilibria, if we take b = 0, (4.8) and (4.9) become This shows that a =ā (resp. b = 0) is the unique maximizer of Γ 0) is a strong equilibrium, thanks to Corollary 3.1.
Remark 4.1. In the above example, for any Q ∼ (a * , b) with b ∈ [0, 7/12), we deduce from (4.10), (4.11), and the second-order expansion in Lemma 3.2 that
This shows that, although Q * ∼ (a * , b * ) is a weak equilibrium, there is incentive to deviate from Q * at state 2: deviating to Q, in a however small interval [0, ε], yields a larger payoff than sticking to Q * . This reminds us of Remark 2.1, and indicates the need for the notion of strong equilibria.
The Discrete-Time Case
In this section, we study the discrete-time model corresponding to that in Section 2. The purpose is twofold. First, when time horizon is infinite, little is known about the existence and characterization of equilibria, even in discrete time. Arguments from Section 3 can be applied here to shed new light on this. Our second focus is the convergence of discrete-time equilibria to their continuous-time counterparts, as the mesh size in time diminishes. As we will see, when discrete-time equilibria converge, they always converge to a weak equilibrium, which, however, need not be strong. Let X = (X t ) t=0,1,... be a time-homogeneous discrete-time Markov chain taking values in S := {1, 2, . . . , N } for some N ∈ N, and takeN := {0, 1, 2, ...}. The transition matrix u = (u ij ) i,j=1,... ,N of X is to be controlled. Let P be the set of probability measures defined on S, i.e.
Consider a continuous function κ :N×S ×P → R. For any (t, i, α) ∈N×S ×P, κ(t, i, α) represents the payoff at time t, given that X t = i and u i = α, where u i denotes the i th row of u. Assume that
Let A i ⊆ P be the set of admissible transitional probabilities when X is at the state i. Define
For any i ∈ S and u ∈ A, (5.2) guarantees that the expected payoff
is well-defined, where E i,u denotes the expectation conditioned on X 0 = i and the transition matrix of X being u. We will write E i for E i,u whenever there is no confusion about u. For any u, u * ∈ A, we introduce the concatenation of u and u * at time 1, denoted by u ⊗ 1 u * . Using this concatenated matrix means that the evolution of X is governed by u at time 0, and then by u * at all subsequent time points. Given an initial state i ∈ S, the expected value is then
Remark 5.1. A strong equilibrium (Definition 2.2) parallels the above discrete-time definition, and admits a clear economic interpretation, as explained in Remark 2.1. By contrast, the precise interpretation of a weak equilibrium (Definition 2.1) is not so clear in the literature.
A handy characterization of equilibria can be established, by following the arguments in Proposition 3.1. To this end, for any i ∈ S and u ∈ A, define
and
For any differentiable function v : P → R, let ∇v(α) be the gradient of v evaluated at α ∈ P, and ∂ n v(α) be the n th component of ∇v(α). Also recall T in (3.11). Proposition 5.1 below can be proved by following line by line the proof of Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 5.1. Let κ(0, i, ·) be C 1 for all i ∈ S. If u * ∈ A be an equilibrium, then for any i ∈ S,
In particular, if u * i is a relative interior point of A i , then
Furthermore, if κ(0, i, ·) is additionally concave for any i ∈ S, then the converse is also true; that is, u * is an equilibrium if and only if (5.6) holds.
To establish the existence of equilibria, arguments used to prove Theorem 3.3 can also be applied here. Since P in (5.1) is by definition compact, we no longer need the compactness assumption in Theorem 3.3, leading to the following very general existence result. 
by u ∼ (α, β). Let δ(0) = 1 and δ(t) = k · λ t−1 for t ∈ N, where k ∈ (0, 1) is a constant. Consider
which are strictly convex. Given u * ∼ (α * , β * ) and u ∼ (α, β), direct calculation shows
If u * ∼ (α * , β * ) is an equilibrium, V 1 (α) and V 2 (β) attain maximums at α = α * and β = β * , respectively. The strict convexity of g 1 and g 2 implies α * , β * ∈ {0, 1}. If u * ∼ (0, 0), then H 1 (u * ) = 0 and H 2 (u * ) = 
Convergence to Continuous Time
Recall the continuous-time setup in Section 2. For the continuous-time payoff function f , we further assume that there exists T > 0, independent of i and q, such that t → |f (t, i, q)| is nonincreasing, for t ≥ T .
(5.8)
Take {δ n } n∈N in R with δ n ↓ 0. For each n ∈ N, define κ n :N × S × P → R by
for each α = (α 1 , . . . , α N ) ∈ P. For any transition matrix u, define the generator Q u,n = (q u,n ij ) by
Then, we introduce A n := {u transition matrix : Q u,n ∈ Q}. (5.11)
For each n ∈ N, consider the discretized problem V n given by (5.3), with κ and A replaced by κ n and A n . Suppose that there exists an equilibrium u n ∈ A n , i.e. V n (i, u n ) ≥ V n (i, u ⊗ 1 u n ) for all i ∈ S and u ∈ A n . Following the notation in (5.5), this means for any i ∈ S and u ∈ A n ,
where H n is defined as in (5.5) with κ replaced by κ n , i.e.
In the following, we will write
for simplicity. The main convergence result is the following.
Theorem 5.2. Assume (2.3), (5.8), and that f (·, i, ·) is continuous for all i ∈ S. If there exists Q * ∈ Q such that (up to a subsequence) Q n → Q * , then Q * satisfies (3.9) for all (i, Q) ∈ S × Q. That is, Q * is a weak equilibrium (under Definition 2.1).
Remark 5.3. Suppose that for the continuous-time problem F in (2.4), D i is a closed convex set and f (0, i, ·) is concave for all i ∈ S. Then, in view of (5.9) and (5.11), Theorem 5.1 implies that an equilibrium u n ∈ A n exists for the discretized problem V n , for all n ∈ N. If we further assume that D i is bounded for all i ∈ S, then (Q n ) n∈N is pre-compact. Then, by Theorem 5.2, any limit point of (Q n ) n∈N is a weak equilibrium (under Definition 2.1).
To establish Theorem 5.2, we need the following technical lemma.
Lemma 5.1. Assume (2.3), (5.8), and that f (·, i, ·) is continuous for all i ∈ S. If there exists Q * ∈ Q such that (up to a subsequence) Q n → Q * , then for any i ∈ S,
The proof of Lemma 5.1 is relegated to Appendix B.2.
Proof of Theorem 5.2. For any i ∈ S and u ∈ A n , (5.12) can be re-written as
Dividing both sides by δ n yields
Thanks to the continuity of f (0, i, ·) and Lemma 5.1, sending n → ∞ gives (3.9).
In general, the limit point Q * in Theorem 5.2 need not be a strong equilibrium. This is demonstrated in the next example: the equilibria for discretized problems converge uniquely to a weak equilibrium for the continuous-time problem, but this weak equilibrium is not strong. 
and g 1 (0) = −1. First, we show that Q * ∼ (0, 0) is a weak equilibrium that is not strong. By (4.2), F 1 (0, 0) − F 2 (0, 0) = This shows that Γ Q * (1, Q) (resp. Γ Q * (2, Q)) is maximized at a = 0 and a = 2k (resp. at b = 0). Hence, Theorem 3.1 readily implies Q * ∼ (0, 0) is a weak equilibrium. On the other hand, consider Q ∼ (2k, 0). Note that Γ Q * (1, Q * ) = Γ Q * (1,Q), and direct calculation shows
thanks to (4.3) and (4.6). Thus, by Proposition 3.2, Q * ∼ (0, 0) is not a strong equilibrium. Now, consider the discretized problems. Denote by u ∼ (α, β) the transition matrix given as in (5.7). For each h > 0, consider the discretized problem V h as in (5.3), where κ is replaced by
If α > 0, then using g 1 (0) = −1,
It can be checked that
, where the last inequality follows from the fact that a → g 1 (a) + 3 4 a is maximized at a = 0 and a = 2k (this was mentioned above when we maximized Γ Q * (1, Q) ). This yields
By (5.14) and (5.15), u * ∼ (0, 0) is an equilibrium for V h , for h > 0 small enough. In view of (5.10), Q h := Q u * ,h → Q * ∼ (0, 0) holds trivially, as Q h ∼ (0, 0) for h > 0 small enough.
Conclusions
In this paper, we introduce the new notion of strong equilibria, as a refinement of the standard formulation of continuous-time equilibria (which we call weak equilibria). As we have shown, there are situations where one finds it beneficial to deviate from an equilibrium under the standard formulation, indicating that the standard formulation does not correspond perfectly to the equilibrium idea. A strong equilibrium, by contrast, is defined analogously to a discrete-time equilibrium, and admits a precise economic interpretation. To elucidate the difference and connection between these two types of equilibria, we focus on the case where the state process is a continuous-time Markov chain. This allows us to derive complete characterizations of strong and weak equilibria, and compare them explicitly in concrete examples. It is of interest to investigate if similar results can be established when the state process is a general diffusion process, the typical setup in previous literature on time-inconsistent stochastic control in continuous time.
Time-inconsistent stopping problems in continuous time, on the other hand, have not received much attention until very recently. Interestingly, two distinct formulations of equilibrium stopping rules emerge from recent developments, and they, in some spirit, correspond to weak and strong equilibria in the control case. In [4] and [3] , the derivative-type operation as in (2.7) is followed closely to define an equilibrium stopping rule, which corresponds to a weak equilibrium in our case. On the other hand, [11] and [12] define an equilibrium by comparing the value of sticking to future selves' strategy and the value of deviating to another strategy at current time. This is similar to the comparison in (1.1), and thus in principle closer to a strong equilibrium in our case. It is of interest to investigate the precise relation between these two types of equilibrium stopping rules, as what we have done here for strong and weak equilibria.
A Proofs for Section 3
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Since X evolves according to Q on the time interval [0, ε], P(X ε = i | X 0 = i) = 1 + q ii ε + o(ε) and P(X t = j | X 0 = i) = q ij ε + o(ε). This, together with (2.3), implies that
Given that X 0 = i, recall that τ is exponentially distributed with parameter λ = −q ii , and thus
Now, observe that
where the second line is due to (A.3) and the continuity of t → f (t, i, Q i ) on [0, ε], and the third line is from the continuity of t → f (t, i, Q i ) at 0 from the right. Let c := sup i∈S Q i < ∞. Then,
Thanks to (2.3), the Lebesgue integral on the right hand side of (A.5) is finite and converges to 0 as ε → 0. It then follows from (A.3) that the right hand side of (A.5) is of o(ε). Combining this and (A.4), we obtain from (A.1) the desired result (3.1). Now, taking Q = Q * in (3.1) gives
. This, together with (3.1), yields
Hence, to prove (3.5), it remains to show that F ε (i, Q) = F (i, Q) + o(1) for all i ∈ S. For each t ≥ 0 and ε > 0, define
where the finiteness follows from S being a finite set. Under (3.2), we have
where the convergence comes from the dominated convergence theorem and (3.3). Note that the dominated convergence theorem is applicable here thanks to (3.3) and (3.4).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Since
dt , we will deal with the two terms on the right hand side one-by-one.
To handle E ε 0 f (t, X t , Q Xt )dt , consider the events A, B, and C that on the interval [0, ε], the state of X does not change, changes exactly once, and changes twice or more, respectively. Take τ in (A.2) and recall that it is exponentially distributed with parameter −q ii . Thus,
Here, (A.6) follows from the estimate
for some 0 < t(ε) < ε. By (3.18), the last term above is o(ε 2 ). On the other hand, let η be the density function of τ , given that τ ≤ ε.
Let τ ′ := inf{t ≥ τ : X t = X τ }. Observe that B = {τ ≤ ε < τ ′ }, and thus
where the third line takes advantage of the fact
while the fourth line follows from (A.9). By estimates similar to (A.8), we get
Thanks to (A.10), we also have the estimate
Now, using the fact that
This, together with (A.7), (A.11), and (A.12), implies
where the equality follows from (3.18) and the dominated convergence theorem, which is applicable here as r(t, ε; i, q) satisfies (3.4) and (3.15) . This shows that F ε (i, Q) = F (i, Q) + εG(i, Q) + o(ε), and thus we can rewrite (A.13) as
By taking Q = Q * in (A.14), we get the corresponding expansion for F (i, Q * ). Subtracting it from (A.14) yields (3.16)
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3.3
Define the set-valued map Φ :
For each Q ∈ Q, the compactness of D i and the continuity of the map q → f (0, i, q) + F (Q) · q, for all i ∈ S, imply that Φ(Q) = ∅. The same continuity also gives the closedness of Φ(Q). On the other hand, by the concavity of q → f (0, i, q), Φ(Q) is convex. Next, we show that Φ is upper semicontinuous. Since D i is compact for all i ∈ S, Q is also compact. The upper semicontinuity of Φ is then equivalent to the sequential characterization: for any {R n } n∈N and {Q n } n∈N in Q with R n → R, Q n → Q, and R n ∈ Φ(Q n ), we have R ∈ Φ(Q). To prove this, it suffices to show that the map
SinceR ∈ Q is arbitrarily chosen, this shows that R ∈ Φ(Q).
Proving (A.15) boils down to establishing the continuity of
Take {Q n } n∈N in Q such that Q n → Q ∈ Q. Denote by µ n and µ the laws of X under Q n and Q, respectively. Note that µ n and µ are probability measures on D([0, ∞); S), the space of càdlàg processes taking values in S. By [8, p. 262, Problem 8], Q n → Q implies that µ n converges weakly to µ. Then, by the Skorokhod representaion theorem, there exists càdlàg processes Y n and Y , defined on the same probability space (Ω, F, P ), such that the laws of Y n and Y are µ n and µ respectively, and Y n → Y under the Skorokhod topology on D([0, ∞); S) P -a.s. In particular, we have Y n t → Y t , P × dt-a.e. Since S is a finite set, we in fact have Y n t = Y t for n large enough, P × dt-a.e. Then
This establishes the continuity of Q → F (Q), and thus gives the upper semicontinuity of Φ. Now, we can apply Kakutani-Fan's fixed-point theorem (see e.g. [9, Theorem 1]) to conclude that Φ admits a fixed point Q * ∈ Q, i.e. Q * ∈ Φ(Q * ). This implies that Q * satisfies (3.9) for all (i, Q) ∈ S × Q, and is thus a weak equilibrium, thanks to Theorem 3.1. If f (0, i, ·) is actually strictly concave for all i ∈ S, then Φ(Q) is a singleton for all Q ∈ Q. Thus, we have Φ(Q * ) = Q * , which implies f (0, i, Q * i ) + F (Q * ) · Q * i > f (0, i, R i ) + F (Q * ) · R i for all R ∈ Q \ {Q * } and i ∈ S. By Corollary 3.1, Q * is a strong equilibrium. Since κ is continuous in α, so is g. With P being compact, A x ⊆ P is also compact, and thus there exists a maximizer α(i) ∈ A i for g. By taking w i := α(i) for all i ∈ S, we get w ∈ Φ(u). For each i ∈ S, the continuity of g : A i → R and the closedness of A i also imply the closedness of the set of optimizers of g. It follows that Φ(u) is closed. Also, g : A i → R is concave, thanks to the concavity of κ in α. The set of optimizers of g is then convex, which yields the convexity of Φ(u). Next, we show that Φ is upper semicontinuous. That is, for any u n , u, w n , w ∈ A with u n → u, w n → w, if w n ∈ Φ(u n ) then w ∈ Φ(u). It suffices to show that the map (u ′ , u) → V (i, u ′ ⊗ 1 u) is continuous, for all i ∈ S. In view of (5.4) and the concavity of κ(0, i, ·), u ′ → V (i, u ′ ⊗ 1 u) is continuous. It remains to show that for any j ∈ S, the map h(u) := E j,u ∞ t=0 κ(t + 1, X t , u Xt ) , u ∈ A is continuous. Take {u n } in A with u n → u. κ(t + 1, k, u n (z))((u n ) t ) jk − κ(t + 1, k, u k )(u t ) jk + 2ε = 2ε, where the matrix (u n ) t (resp. u t ) is the t-fold product of u n (resp. u). By the arbitrariness of ε > 0, h is continuous. Now, by Kakutani-Fan's fixed-point theorem (see e.g. [9, Theorem 1]), Φ admits a fixed point, i.e. there exists u * ∈ A such that u * ∈ Φ(u * ). That is, u * is an equilibrium.
B Proofs for
B.2 Proof of Lemma 5.1
For clarity, in the proof below we will denote by X the continuous-time Markov chain and Y the discrete-time Markov chain, respectively. First, observe that
Let I n 1 , I n 2 , and I n 3 denote the second, third, and fourth line, respectively, in the above inequality. Consider ) − E i,Q n f ((k + 1)δ n , X kδn , Q n X kδn ) + 2ε.
Observe that
whereũ n is the transition matrix for the Markov chain (X kδn ) k induced by Q n . That is, with the probability P induced by Q n = (q n ij ), we haveũ n ij = P(X δn = j | X 0 = i). Note that u n ij = 1 + q n ii δ n + o(δ n ), j = i, q n ij δ n + o(δ n ), j = i, = u ij + o(δ n ).
It follows that ((ũ n ) k ) ij = ((u n ) k ) ij + k · o(δ n ) · (1 + o(δ n )) k . Now, since
we conclude that I and the event A n k := {there is no jump for X in the time interval (kδ n , (k + 1)δ n ]}. Then, we have
As a result, I By the arbitrariness of ε > 0, we get I n 2 → 0. Finally, from the argument in the proof of Theorem 3.3, we have I n 3 → 0.
